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Abstract— We investigate the probabilistic feasibility of
randomized solutions to two distinct classes of uncertain
multi-agent optimization programs. We first assume that only
the constraints of the program are affected by uncertainty,
while the cost function is arbitrary. Leveraging recent a
posteriori developments of the scenario approach, we provide
probabilistic guarantees for all feasible solutions of the
program under study. This result is particularly useful in
cases where numerical difficulties related to the convergence of
the solution-seeking algorithm hinder the exact quantification
of the optimal solution. Furthermore, it can be applied to
cases where the agents’ incentives lead to a suboptimal
solution, e.g., under a non-cooperative setting. We then focus
on optimization programs where the cost function admits an
aggregate representation and depends on uncertainty while
constraints are deterministic. By exploiting the structure
of the program under study and leveraging the so called
support rank notion, we provide agent-independent robustness
certificates for the optimal solution, i.e., the constructed bound
on the probability of constraint violation does not depend
on the number of agents, but only on the dimension of the
agents’ decision. This substantially reduces the number of
samples required to achieve a certain level of probabilistic
robustness as the number of agents increases. All robustness
certificates provided in this paper are distribution-free and can
be used alongside any optimization algorithm. Our theoretical
results are accompanied by a numerical case study involving
a charging control problem of a fleet of electric vehicles.
Keywords: Scenario approach, Multi-agent problems, Opti-
mization, Feasibility guarantees, Electric Vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
A vast amount of today’s challenges in the domains of
energy systems [1], [2], traffic networks [3], economics
[4] and the social sciences [5], [6] revolve around multi-
agent systems, i.e., systems which comprise different enti-
ties/agents that interact with each other and make decisions,
based on individual or collective criteria. Existing literature
provides a plethora of methods to solve such problems.
Each method is appropriately designed to fit the structure
of these interactions and the agents’ incentives. To address
challenges, related to the computational complexity issues
and privacy concerns of solving a multi-agent optimization
problem in a centralised fashion, several decentralised or
distributed coordination schemes have been proposed [7],
[8]. In the decentralised case, agents optimize their cost
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function locally and then communicate their strategies to a
central authority. In the distributed case, a central authority
is absent and agents communicate with each other over a
network, exchanging information with agents considered as
neighbours given the underlying communication protocol. In
either case, the presence of uncertainty in such problems
constitutes a critical factor that, if not taken into account,
could lead to unpredictable behaviour, hence it is of major
importance to accompany the solutions of such algorithms
with robustness certificates. In this paper we assume that
the probability distribution of the uncertainty is considered
unknown and adopt a data-driven approach, where the un-
certainty is represented by means of scenarios that could
be either available as historical data, or extracted via some
prediction model. To this end, we work under the framework
of the so called scenario approach.
The scenario approach is a well-established mathematical
technique [9], [10], [11], and still a highly active research
area (see [12], [13] for some recent developments), originally
introduced to provide a priori probabilistic guarantees for so-
lutions of uncertain convex optimization programs. Recently,
the theory has been extended to non-convex decision making
problems [12], [13] where the probabilistic guarantees are
obtained in an a posteriori fashion. The main advantage
of the scenario approach is its applicability under very
general conditions, since it does not require the knowledge
of the uncertainty set or the probability distribution, unlike
robust [14] and stochastic optimization [15]. According to the
scenario approach, the original problem can be approximated
by solving a computationally tractable approximate problem,
the so called scenario program consisting of a finite number
of constraints, each of them corresponding to a different
realization of the uncertain parameter. In this realm we
present some of the challenges that pertain uncertain multi-
agent systems.
B. Challenges to be addressed and main contributions
In many problems of practical interest, agents’ decisions
are feasible thus satisfying the imposed constraints, however
they are not necessarily optimal. This can be due to a variety
of reasons, such as:
1) Numerical difficulties related to the convergence prop-
erties of the solution-seeking algorithm that hinder the
exact quantification of the optimal solution;
2) The nature of agents’ incentives. For example, when a
non-cooperative scheme is adopted, the social welfare
optimum cannot be usually achieved, thus resorting to
suboptimal solution concepts, such as equilibria;
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TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF MAIN RESULTS ACCORDING TO THEIR MAIN FEATURES AND COMPARISON WITH EXISTING LITERATURE
Type of solution Nature of
certificate
Scalability Class of problems Result
Entire feasible set A posteriori Agent dependent Feasibility programs with uncertain con-
vex constraints
Thm. 2
Subset of feasible solu-
tions
A priori Agent dependent Feasibility programs with uncertain convex
constraints
Thm. 2 of [16]
Variational inequality
solution set
A posteriori Agent dependent Variational inequality problems with uncer-
tain convex constraints
Thm. 1 of [17]
Variational inequality
solution set
A posteriori Agent dependent Aggregative games with uncertain affine
constraints
Thm. 1 of [18]
Unique optimizer A priori Agent
independent
Optimization programs with uncertain
aggregative term in the cost
Thm. 3
Unique variational in-
equality solution
A posteriori
& a priori
Agent dependent Variational inequalities with uncertain cost
or constraints
Cor. 1 of [19], Thm. 9 of
[20], Thm. 5 of [21] (only
a posteriori)
However, even for cases where the nature of the problem
allows for the quantification of a social welfare optimum
with high precision, a major challenge in investigating the
probabilistic robustness of such solutions is the dependence
of the provided certificates on the number of agents. Given
that we wish to obtain identical probabilistic guarantees
as the population increases, a larger number of samples
is required. This fact renders the provided guarantees
conservative for large scale applications. As such, it is
of utmost importance to show that for certain classes of
problems, common in practical applications, the obtained
probabilistic guarantees can be agent independent. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We address the challenges related to the lack of opti-
mality of the agents’ decisions, by considering a set-up,
where the choice of the cost function can be arbitrary
and the uncertainty affects only the constraints. We,
then, leverage recent results of [13] in order to pro-
vide a posteriori robustness certificates for the entire
feasibility region1. The theoretical framework of [22],
initially developed only for uncertain feasibility prob-
lems with polytopic constraints, is extended in our set-
up to account for general (possibly coupling) uncertain
convex constraints. An immediate consequence of this
result is that distribution-free probabilistic guarantees
for the entire set of solutions to optimization programs
can be provided, thus circumventing the need for
selecting a unique optimizer via the enforcement of
a tie-break rule.
2) We then focus on a specific class of uncertain multi-
agent programs, prevalent in many practical applica-
tions, where the cost is considered to be a function
of the aggregate decision and affected by uncertainty.
1In this paper we will focus on optimization programs affected by
uncertainty. It is important to mention, though, that our results are applicable
to more general uncertain feasibility programs. This allows their use for
providing certificates for the feasibility region of other classes of problems,
as well, such as variational inequality problems and generalised Nash
equilibrium problems [22].
A similar problem formulation has been considered
in [23] and is extended to our set-up to account
for the presence of uncertainty in the cost function.
Other problems whose structure shares similarities
with our work can be found in [24], [25], [26], though
under a purely deterministic and game-theoretic set-
up. Following the recent developments in [27] we
show based on the notion of the support rank [28],
that the obtained probabilistic feasibility certificates
are agent independent. This result directly outperforms
probabilistic feasibility statements obtained by a direct
application of the scenario approach theory [29], and
has superior scalability properties as it does not depend
on the number of agents involved.
The contributions of our main results in comparison with
results in the literature are summarised in Table I. Our
first contribution provides probabilistic guarantees, in an
a posteriori fashion, that hold for the entire feasibility
region in contrast with the a priori result in [16], where
the construction of a feasible subset from the convex hull
of randomized optimizers may produce a "thin" subset of
the feasible region. Another recent contribution [17] uses
a similar approach to [22] to provide guarantees applicable
not for the entire feasibility region but for the solution set of
uncertain variational inequalities in an a posteriori fashion.
For our second contribution, the nature of the certificates is a
priori. Assuming uniqueness of the solution, we exploit the
aggregative structure of the cost to provide results that are
agent independent. The aggregative nature of the cost has
been exploited in several works (see [20], [21] and [18]),
however, guarantees provided in these works are dependent
on the number of agents. It should be apparent from Table
I that our results are the first of their kind to provide
guarantees for the entire feasibility region, as well as the first
agent independent result for a particular class of optimization
programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II probabilistic guarantees for all feasible solutions of opti-
mization programs with arbitrary cost and uncertain convex
constraints are provided. Section III focuses on providing
agent-independent robustness certificates for the optimal
solution set of a specific class of aggregative optimization
programs with uncertain cost. The aforementioned results are
used in Section IV in the context of a numerical study on
the charging control problem for a fleet of electric vehicles.
Section V concludes the paper and provides some potential
future research directions.
C. Notation
Let N = {1, . . . ,N} be the index set of all agents, where
N denotes their total number and xi the strategy of agent i
taking values in the deterministic set Xi ⊆ Rn. We denote
x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X = ∏i∈N Xi ⊆ RnN the collection of all
agents’ strategies and bdry(X) the boundary of a set X .
Similarly, the vector x−i = (x j) j∈N , j 6=i ∈ ∏ j∈N , j 6=i X j ⊆
Rn(N−1) denotes the collection of the decision vectors of all
other agents’ strategies except for that of agent i. Let θ be
an uncertain parameter defined on the (possibly unknown)
probability space (Θ,F ,P), where Θ is the sample space,
equipped with a σ -algebra F and a probability measure
P. Furthermore, let {θm}m∈M ∈ ΘM , M = {1, . . . ,M} be a
finite collection of M independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) scenarios/realisations of the uncertain vector θ , where
ΘM is the cartesian product of multiple copies of the sample
space Θ. Finally, PM = ∏m∈M P is the associated product
probability measure. The symbols x and (xi,x−i) are used
interchangeably in this paper, depending on the context.
II. OPTIMIZATION PROGRAMS WITH UNCERTAINTY IN
THE CONSTRAINTS
A. The convex case
Consider the following optimization program
PΘ : min
x∈X
J(x) subject to x ∈
⋂
θ∈Θ
Xθ , (1)
where the cost function J(x) can be chosen arbitrarily (even
feasibility programs would be admissible), x is a decision
vector taking values in X ⊂ Rd and Xθ is dictated by the
uncertain parameter θ . We seek to provide probabilistic
guarantees for all feasible solutions of this class of programs.
For the optimization program (1), we define the follow-
ing scenario program, where the multi-sample {θm}m∈M is
assumed to be drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from ΘM .
PM : min
x∈X
J(x) subject to x ∈
⋂
m∈M
Xθm . (2)
Our results depend on a convex constraint structure, thus we
impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1: 1) The deterministic constraint set X is
a non-empty, compact and convex set.
2) For any random sample θ ∈Θ, we have that Xθ = {x∈
Rd : u(x,θ)≤ 0}, where u : Rd×Θ→ Rq is a vector-
valued convex function.
3) For any fixed multi-sample {θm}m∈M the convex set
CM = {⋂m∈M Xθm}⋂X = {x ∈ X : u(x,θm)≤ 0,∀ m ∈
M } has a non-empty interior.
Assumption 1 guarantees that PM admits at least one solution
for any chosen multisample {θm}m∈M .
The optimization program PM can be equivalently written
as minJ(x) subject to x ∈ CM. Upon finding the feasibility
domain CM of the problem PM , we are interested in investi-
gating the robustness properties collectively for all the points
of this domain to yet unseen samples, in other words in
quantifying the probability that a new sample θ ∈Θ is drawn
such that the constraint Xθ defined by this sample is not
satisfied by some point x ∈ CM . This concept, which is of
crucial importance for our work, is known in the literature
as the probability of violation and is adapted in our context
to represent the probability of violation of an entire set. By
Definition 1 in [9] the probability of violation of a given
point x ∈CM is defined as:
V (x) = P
{
θ ∈Θ : x /∈ Xθ
}
. (3)
By Assumption 1, the probability of violation can be equiv-
alently written as V (x) = P
{
θ ∈ Θ : u(x,θ) > 0
}
. We can
now define the probability of violation of the entire convex
set CM .
Definition 1: Let C ⊆ 2X be the set of all non-empty,
compact and convex sets contained in X . For any CM ∈C we
define the probability of violation of the set CM as a mapping
V : C → [0,1] given by the following relation:
V(CM) = sup
x∈CM
V (x).
Definition 1 can be considered a special case of Definition
2 in [16]. In Definition 2 below two concepts of crucial
importance are introduced.
Definition 2: 1) For any M, an algorithm is a mapping
AM : ΘM → C ⊆ 2X that associates the multi-sample
{θm}m∈M to a unique convex set CM ∈ C .
2) Given a multi-sample {θm}m∈M ∈ΘM , a set of samples
{θm}m∈Ik ⊆ {θm}m∈M , where Ik = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}
is called a support subsample if Ak({θm}m∈Ik) =
AM({θm}m∈M ) i.e., the solution returned by the al-
gorithm when fed with {θm}m∈Ik coincides with the
one obtained when the entire multi-sample is used. The
support subsample with the smallest cardinality among
all the possible support subsamples, is known as the
minimal support subsample.
3) A support subsample function is a mapping of the form
BM : {θm}m∈M →{m1,m2, . . . ,mk} that takes as input
all the samples and returns as output only the indices
of the samples that belong to the support subsample.
Note that the notions of support subsample and support
subsample function in Definitions 2.2, 2.3 are respectively
referred to as compression set and compression function in
[30]. The cardinality of the support subsample {θm}m∈Ik is
by definition the cardinality of the output of the function
BM , namely, k = |BM({θm}m∈M )|. In our set-up the minimal
support subsample consists of the indices of the samples that
are of support for the entire feasibility region, according to
the following definition
Definition 3: (Support sample for the feasibility region)
A sample θ j ∈ {θm}m∈M is said to be of support for the
Xθ1
Xθ2
Xθ3
Xθ4
X
CM
Fig. 1. The feasibility region CM (in orange) and its connection with
random convex constraints (in purple) produced by four i.i.d. samples
{θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4}. The constraint in cyan corresponds to the deterministic
constraint X . Only the indices of the samples θ1,θ2,θ3 belong to the minimal
support subsample since their corresponding constraints form the boundary
of CM . Note that constraint Xθ3 gives rise to multiple "facets".
feasible set CM of PM if its removal leads to an enlargement
of the feasible region, i.e., when {⋂m∈M Xθm}\Xθ j ⊃CM or,
equivalently, when the set bdry(Xθ j)
⋂
CM is non-empty.
The number of support samples of the feasible region
or, equivalently, the cardinality of the minimal support sub-
sample is denoted as FM . The constraints that correspond
to indices from the minimal support subsample can be
alternatively viewed as an extension of the notion of the
facets of a polytope (see Definition 2.1 in [31]) adapted to
the more general case of compact and convex sets. Note
that a single constraint may give rise to multiple "facets".
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the minimal support
subsample by showing the feasible region formed by random
convex constraints. Note that only the indices of the samples
θ1,θ2,θ3 belong to the minimal support subsample, since if
we feed only these samples as input into the algorithm AM
the feasible set CM is returned.
Another important notion used in our work is the notion
of an extreme point. An extreme point can be viewed as an
extension of the vertex of a polytope for arbitrary compact
and convex sets and is defined as a point which is not in the
interior of any line segment lying entirely in the set. This
property is formally presented in the following definition.
Definition 4: (Extreme points) [32]. An extreme point of
a convex set C is a point x ∈ C for which the following
property holds: If x can be written as a convex combination
of the form x= λx1+(1−λ )x2 with x1,x2 ∈C and λ ∈ [0,1],
then x1 = x and/or x2 = x.
Note that the number of extreme points of a convex set
depends on the geometry of the set under study and can
also be infinite, e.g., in the case of a d-dimensional ball.
Our work focuses on compact and convex sets defined over
a finite-dimensional space, where the following theorem can
be applied.
Theorem 1: (Minkowski – Caratheodory Theorem) [32].
Let C be a compact convex subset of Rd of dimension d.
Then any point in C is a convex combination of at most
d+1 extreme points.
We equip the set of extreme points of the convex set CM
with indices and denote this set of indices E(CM), while
bdry(CM) refers to the boundary of CM . It is important to
emphasize that the dependence of the convex set CM on the
multi-sample {θm}m∈M implies that |BM| (and |E(CM)|) are
random variables that depend on {θm}m∈M .
Next we define the set
Cθ = {C ∈ C : u(x j,θ)≤ 0, ∀ j ∈ E(C)}
= {C ∈ C : C ⊆ Xθ}, (4)
of all the non-empty, compact and convex sets where ele-
ments C satisfy the constraint associated with the sample
θ ∈ Θ. Note that if all the extreme points of the set satisfy
the inequality u(·,θ) ≤ 0, then every point x ∈ C of the
set satisfies it as well. To see this, note that x can always
be expressed as a convex combination of the set’s extreme
points.
Our aim is to provide probabilistic guarantees for a non-
empty, convex and compact set CM constructed by the
intersection of M random realizations of the uncertain convex
constraint Xθ = {x∈ X : u(x,θ)≤ 0}, where u :Rd×Θ→Rq
is a convex function with respect to the decision variable x.
Theorem 2: Consider Assumption 1 and any AM,BM as
in Definition 2. Fix β ∈ (0,1) and define the violation level
function ε : {0, ...,M}→ [0,1] such that
ε(M) = 1 and
M−1
∑
k=0
(
M
k
)
(1− ε(k))M−k = β . (5)
We have that
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM : V(CM)> ε(k∗)
}
≤ β ,
where k∗ = FM is the number of support samples according
to Definition 3.
Proof: For a fixed multisample {θm}m∈M ∈ ΘM con-
sider an arbitrary point x ∈CM . Then, the following inequal-
ities are satisfied
V (x) = P
{
θ ∈Θ : x /∈ Xθ
}
= P
{
θ ∈Θ : u(x,θ)> 0
}
(i)
= P
{
θ ∈Θ : u( ∑
j∈Id+1
λ jx j,θ)> 0
}
(ii)
≤ P
{
θ ∈Θ : ∑
j∈Id+1
λ ju(x j,θ)> 0
}
≤ P
{
θ ∈Θ : ∑
j∈Id+1
λ j max
j∈Id+1
u(x j,θ)> 0
}
≤ P
{
θ ∈Θ : max
j∈Id+1
u(x j,θ)> 0
}
= P
{ ⋃
j∈Id+1
{
θ ∈Θ : u(x j,θ)> 0
}}
(iii)
≤ P
{ ⋃
j∈E(CM)
{
θ ∈Θ : u(x j,θ)> 0
}}
, (6)
Equality (i) is derived from Theorem 1, where the set under
study is the convex set CM . In our case, the Minkowski-
Caratheodory theorem states that any arbitrary point of the
set x ∈ CM can be represented as a convex combination of
at most d+1 extreme points of CM , which means that there
exists a subset of extreme points {x j} j∈Id+1 ⊆ {x j} j∈E(CM)
such that x = ∑ j∈Id+1 λ jx j, where ∑ j∈Id+1 λ j = 1 and λ j ≥
0, ∀ j ∈ Id+1. Equality (ii) stems from the fact that u
is a convex function of x for any given θ ∈ Θ. The last
inequality follows from the fact that Id+1 is a set of indices
corresponding to extreme points and as such is a subset of
E(CM). Since (6) holds for all x ∈CM , it can equivalently be
written as
V(CM) = sup
x∈CM
V (x)≤ P
{ ⋃
j∈E(CM)
{
θ ∈Θ : u(x j,θ)> 0
}}
.
Therefore, for any multi-sample {θm}m∈M and for any car-
dinality (not necessarily minimal) of the support subsample
k ∈ {1, ...,N} the following inequalities are satisfied:
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM : V(CM)> ε(k∗)
}
≤ PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM:
P
{ ⋃
j∈E(CM)
{
θ ∈Θ : u(x j,θ)> 0
}
> ε(k∗)
}
= PM
{
{θm}m∈M∈ΘM :
P
{
θ ∈Θ : ∃ j ∈ E(CM),u(x j,θ)>0
}
>ε(k∗)
}
= PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM :
P
{
θ ∈Θ : CM 6⊆ Xθ
}
> ε(k∗)
}
, (7)
where the last equality is due to (4). Define now an algorithm
AM as in Definition 2.1, that returns the convex set confined
by the feasibility region of CM . By construction, AM satisfies
Assumption 1 of [13], since for any multi-sample {θm}m∈M
it holds that AM({θm}m∈M ) ∈ Cθm , for all m ∈ M . The
satisfaction of Assumption 1 paves the way for the use of
Theorem 1 of [13]. In particular, Theorem 1 of [13] implies
that the right-hand side of (7) can be upper bounded by β .
As such, we have that
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM: P
{
θ ∈Θ :CM 6⊆ Xθ
}
> ε(k∗)
}
=
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM: P
{
θ ∈Θ :CM /∈ Cθ
}
> ε(k∗)
}
≤ β .
(8)
From (7) and (8) we obtain that:
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM : V(CM)> ε(k)
}
≤ β , (9)
thus concluding the proof.
The result of Theorem 2 implies that with confidence at
least 1− β , the probability that there exists at least one
feasible solution of CM that violates the constraints for a new
realization θ ∈ Θ, is at most equal to ε(k∗). Note that our
guarantees trivially hold for any subregion of the feasible set.
However, the support subsample cannot be easily computed
in the general case. Restricting our attention to programs
subject to uncertain affine constraints, provides the means to
quantify the support subsample.
B. The polytopic case
Assuming the presence of affine constraints only, we
replace Assumption 1 with the following:
Assumption 2: Consider Assumption 1 and further assume
that X is polytopic2 and u(x,θ) = aT x−b≤ 0, where a∈Rd ,
b ∈ R and θ = (aT b) ∈ Rd+1.
Since all feasibility sets are now polytopic, rather than C and
CM , we use Π and ΠM , respectively. Under Assumption 2, the
cardinality of the minimal support subsample coincides by
definition with the number of random facets (see Definition
2.1 in [31]) of the polytope and Theorem 2 gives rise to the
following corollary.
Corollary 1: Consider Assumption 2 and any AM,BM as
in Definition 2. Fix β ∈ (0,1) and define the violation level
ε : {0, ...,M}→ [0,1] as a function such that
ε(M) = 1 and
M−1
∑
k=0
(
M
k
)
(1− ε(k))M−k = β . (10)
We have that
PM
{
{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM : V(ΠM)> ε(k∗)
}
≤ β ,
where k∗ = FM is the number of facets of ΠM .
Note that, even though during the proof of our theorem
we also use the vertices of the polytope, only the num-
ber of facets is needed to provide probabilistic guarantees
for the entire feasibility region. This feature is appealing
from a computational point of view as, in most practical
cases, the constructed polytope has a significantly smaller
number of facets than extreme points. To illustrate this,
consider a finite horizon multi-agent control problem with N
agents, where each agent’s decision is subject to upper and
lower bounds at each time instance t ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Hence,
for a multi-sample {θm}Mm=1 ∈ ΘM , the feasibility domain
∏nt=1∏
N
i=1
⋂
m=1,...,M[x
i
t(θm),xit(θm)] of the problem is a hy-
perrectangle whose number of facets F = 2Nn grows linearly
with respect to the number of decision variables, while for
the number of vertices is given by V = 2Nn, which grows
at an exponential rate with respect to Nn. Such constraints
arise in several applications including the electric vehicle
scheduling problem of Section IV.
Note that, as the dimension of the decision vector in-
creases, evaluating the minimal support subsample becomes
computationally challenging. However, several efficient al-
gorithms have been proposed for detecting redundant con-
straints out of the initial set of affine constraints. The
currently fastest algorithm for redundancy detection is Clark-
son’s algorithm [33]. Reducing the computational complexity
of Clarkson’s algorithm is still an active research area
in computational geometry and combinatorics. One recent
noteworthy attempt can be found in [34].
2A polytope Π ∈ Rd can be expressed by its H-representation, i.e., the
intersection of a finite number of halfspaces, and also as the convex hull
of its vertex set v(Π) = {x1, ...,xQ} i.e, Π = conv(v(Π)) = {∑Qj=1 x jλ j :
∑Qj=1 λ j = 1,λ j ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,Q}, where v(·) and conv(·) denote the set of
vertices of the polytope and the convex hull, respectively. This representation
is generally known as V -representation.
III. OPTIMIZATION PROGRAMS WITH UNCERTAINTY IN
THE COST
A. Optimization setting
In this section we show that for a specific class of problems
frequently arising in practical applications, the probabilistic
feasibility guarantees for the optimizers of the problem can
be substantially improved by leveraging the notion of the so
called support rank [28]. Assuming an uncertain cost func-
tion of a specific form and deterministic local constraints,
we consider now the following program
P : min
x∈X
J(x), (11)
where J(x) = f (x) +max
θ∈Θ
g(x,θ) and f : X → R, g : X ×
Θ→ R is the deterministic and the uncertain part of the
cost function, respectively. In addition, the cost under study
satisfies the following assumption
Assumption 3: 1) f is jointly convex with respect to all
agents’ decision vectors, and the set X is non-empty,
compact and convex.
2) g takes the aggregative form
g(x,θ) = ∑
i∈N
gi(xi,x−i,θ) and
gi(xi,x−i,θ) = xTi (A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ)),
where σ : X →Rn is a mapping (xi)i∈N 7→ ∑
i∈N
xi and
A :Θ→Rn×n, b :Θ→Rn are uncertain mappings with
A(θ) being a positive semi-definite matrix for all θ ∈
Θ.
Under Assumption 3 the function J is convex, as the point-
wise maximum of an arbitrary number of convex functions
is itself a convex function [35]. From Assumption 3.2 the
uncertain counterpart of the cost function under study takes
the form
g(x,θ) = σ(x)T (A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ)).
The proposed structure captures a wide class of engineering
problems, including the electric vehicle charging problem
detailed in Section IV. Since g is convex, using an epigraphic
reformulation we recast P to the equivalent semi-infinite
program
P
′
: min
x∈X ,γ∈R
f (x)+ γ
subject to h(x,γ,θ)≤ 0, ∀ θ ∈Θ, (12)
where h(x,γ,θ) = g(x,θ)− γ . In addition, if (x∗,γ∗) is the
optimal solution of problem P
′
, then x∗ is the optimal
solution of the original problem P. Due to the presence
of uncertainty and the possibly infinite cardinality of Θ,
problem P
′
is very difficult to solve, without imposing any
further assumptions on the geometry of the sample set Θ
and/or the underlying probability distribution P. To overcome
this issue, we adopt again a scenario-based scheme [36].
The corresponding scenario program of the uncertain semi-
infinite program P
′
is thus given by
P
′
SC : minx∈X ,γ∈R
f (x)+ γ
subject to h(x,γ,θm)≤ 0, ∀ m ∈M , (13)
where {θm}m∈M ∈ΘM is an i.i.d. multi-sample of cardinality
M. For the scenario program under study, we introduce the
following assumption:
Assumption 4: 1) For any multi-sample {θm}m∈M , the
scenario program P
′
SC admits a feasible solution.
2) The optimal solution (x∗,γ∗) of the scenario program
P
′
SC is unique.
In case multiple optimal points exist, one can use a convex
tie-break rule to select a unique solution. The following
concept, at the core of the scenario approach, is important
for the derivation of the results in the next subsection, where
agent-independent robustness certificates are provided for the
optimal solution. Note that this is similar to Definition 3, but
it refers now to the optimal solution and not to the feasibility
region.
Definition 5: (Support constraint [10]) Fix any i.i.d. mul-
tisample {θm}m∈M ∈ ΘM and let x∗0 = x∗0({θm}m∈M ) be
the unique optimal solution of the corresponding scenario
program of P, when all the M samples are taken into ac-
count. Let x∗−s = x∗−s({θm}m∈M \θs) be the optimal solution
obtained after removal of sample θs. If x∗0 6= x∗−s we say that
the constraint that corresponds to sample θs is a support
constraint.
B. Agent independent probabilistic feasibility guarantees for
a unique solution
In many practical applications there are cases where a
random constraint may leave a linear subspace unconstrained
for any possible sample θ ∈ Θ. This observation motivated
the concept of the support rank as introduced in [28], which
allows us to provide tighter probabilistic guarantees for the
problem under study. Let y ∈ Y ⊆ Rd and consider the
following semi-infinite optimization program
min
y∈Y
cT y
subject to l(y,θ)≤ 0, ∀ θ ∈Θ. (14)
Notice that the objective function is linear without loss of
generality and in the opposite case an epigraphic reformu-
lation could be introduced. Denoting the collection of all
the linear subspaces of Rd as L , we consider all the linear
subspaces L ∈ L that, under the presence of the random
constraint (14), remain unconstrained for any uncertainty
realization θ ∈Θ and any point y ∈ Y , i.e., the set
U =
⋂
θ∈Θ
⋂
y∈Y
{L ∈L : L⊂ F(y,θ)},
where F(y,θ) = {ξ ∈ Rd : l(y+ξ ,θ) = l(y,θ)}.
Definition 6: (Support rank [28])
The support rank ρ ∈ {0, . . . ,d} of a random constraint
equals to the dimension of the problem d minus the di-
mension of the maximal unconstrained linear subspace Lmax,
i.e, ρ = d−dim(Lmax). By maximal unconstrained subspace
we mean the unique maximal element Lmax ∈U for which
L⊆ Lmax, for all L ∈U .
From the support rank definition (see Lemma 3.8 in
[28]) we have that Helly’s dimension can be upper bounded
by the support rank instead of the dimension d of the
problem, which is a more conservative upper bound [10],
ζ ≤ ρ ∈ {0, . . . ,d}, where ζ denotes the support dimension,
a notion similar to that of Helly’s dimension extended for the
case of multiple random constraints (see [28]). Keeping this
relation in mind, our main goal is to obtain a bound for the
support rank of the random constraint of problem P
′
, thus
improving the robustness certificates of its optimal solution.
The following proposition aims at finding an upper bound
for the support rank ρ of the random constraint (12), that
is independent from the number of agents involved in the
optimization program.
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the support
rank ρ of the random constraint (12) in P′ , has an agent
independent upper bound, and in particular, ρ ≤ n+1.
Proof: The dimension of the problem under study is
d = nN +1, due to the presence of the epigraphic variable.
Let L be the collection of all linear subspaces in RnN+1. We
aim at finding the dimension of the subspace that remains
unconstrained for a scenario program subject to the random
constraint h(x,γ,θ) ≤ 0 for any uncertain realisation θ ∈ Θ
and any decision vector (x,γ) ∈ X ×R. We first define the
collection of linear subspaces that are contained in all the
sets F(x,γ,θ):
U =
⋂
θ∈Θ
⋂
(x,γ)∈RnN+1
{L ∈L : L⊂ F(x,γ,θ)},where
F(x,γ,θ) ={(ξ ,ξ ′) ∈ RnN+1 :
h(x+ξ ,γ+ξ ′,θ) = h(x,γ,θ)}
In our case, h(x+ξ ,γ+ξ ′,θ) = h(x,γ,θ) yields:
σ(x+ξ )T (A(θ)σ(x+ξ )+b(θ))− (γ+ξ ′) =
= σ(x)T (A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ))− γ,
⇐⇒ σT (x)A(θ)σ(ξ )+σT (ξ )A(θ)σ(x)+
σT (ξ )A(θ)σ(ξ )+σT (ξ )b(θ)−ξ ′ = 0,
⇐⇒ σT (ξ )AT (θ)σ(x)+σT (ξ )(A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ))+
σT (ξ )A(θ)σ(ξ )−ξ ′ = 0,
where the first equivalence stems from the fact that σ(x+ξ )
is linear with respect to its arguments, and the second one
after some algebraic rearrangement. Note that each of the
terms above is scalar, which means that it is equal to its
transpose for all x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ, while by Assumption 3,
AT (θ) = A(θ) for any θ ∈Θ. As such,
σT (ξ )(2A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ))+σT (ξ )A(θ)σ(ξ )−ξ ′ = 0.
(15)
Using the equalities σT (ξ )(2A(θ)σ(x) + b(θ)) = (11×N ⊗
(2A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ))T )ξ and σT (ξ )A(θ)σ(ξ ) = ξ T (1N×N⊗
A(θ))ξ , where 11×N denotes a row vector with all elements
being equal to one and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product,
(15) can be written in the following form:
(11×N⊗ (2σT (x)A(θ)+bT (θ)))ξ+
ξ T (1N×N⊗A(θ))ξ −ξ ′ = 0, (16)
Let C˜ : X ×Θ→ RnN , A˜ : Θ→ RnN×nN , where C˜(x,θ) =
11×N ⊗ (2σT (x)A(θ) + bT (θ)) and A˜(θ) = 1N×N ⊗ A(θ),
respectively. Then, equation (16) can be written as:
C˜(x,θ)ξ +ξ T A˜(θ)ξ −ξ ′ = 0,
⇐⇒ (C˜(x,θ) −1)(ξξ ′
)
+
(
ξ ξ ′
)( A˜(θ) 0nN×1
01×nN 0
)(
ξ
ξ ′
)
= 0,
⇐⇒V (x,θ)w+wT P(θ)w = 0,
where, V (x,θ) =
(
C˜(x,θ) −1), P(θ) = ( A˜(θ) 0nN×101×nN 0
)
and w =
(
ξ
ξ ′
)
. We need to find an unconstrained linear
subspace that is a subset of F(x,γ,θ). We define
L(x,γ,θ) = {w ∈ RnN+1 :
(
P(θ)
V (x,θ)
)
w = 0}.
We can easily see that L(x,γ,θ) ⊂ F(x,γ,θ). As such,
the random constraint h(x,γ,θ) ≤ 0 cannot constrain any
of the dimensions of L(x,γ,θ) (also denoted as L for
simplicity). Let Q(x,γ,θ) =
(
P(θ)
V (x,θ)
)
. Then L(x,γ,θ) =
nullspace(Q(x,γ,θ)) and from nullity-rank theorem [37]
we have that dim(L(x,γ,θ)) = nN + 1− rank(Q(x,γ,θ)).
Since rank(P(θ)) = n and rank(V (x,θ)) = 1, this means that
rank(Q(x,γ,θ))= n+1, which implies that dim(L(x,γ,θ))=
nN + 1− (n+ 1). Notice that the unconstrained subspace
that we chose may not be the maximal one. This means
that the support dimension is ρ = nN + 1− dim(Lmax) ≤
nN+1−dim(L) = n+1, thus concluding the proof.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 when com-
bined with Theorem 4.1 of [28] is the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Let (x∗,γ∗) denote the optimal solution of the
scenario program P
′
SC. Under Assumptions 3 and 4 we have
that
PM{{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM :
P(θ ∈Θ : h(x∗,γ∗,θ)> 0)> ε} ≤ β , (17)
where β =
n
∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
ε j(1− ε)M− j. (18)
The bound obtained from Theorem 3 constitutes a major
improvement for this class of problems, since, irrespective
of the number of agents N, the same number of samples M
is required to provide identical robustness certificates given
a local decision vector of size n. The proof of this theorem,
is a direct application of the scenario approach theory (see
Theorem 2.4 in [10], and Theorem 4.1 in [28], where the
number of support constraints is replaced by the obtained
bound for the support rank, namely, n+1). Note that in the
absence of Proposition 1, a direct application of the scenario
approach theory [10] to the problem under consideration
would still result in (17), however, (18) would be replaced
by
β =
nN
∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
ε j(1− ε)M− j, (19)
where the dependence of the guarantees on the number of
agents N is apparent.
Corollary 2 establishes a link between Theorem 3 and
the initial program under study P by providing probabilistic
performance guarantees for the optimal solution. Specifically,
it quantifies, in an a priori fashion, the probability that the
cost that corresponds to the optimal value x∗ of P′SC will
deteriorate, when a new sample θ ∈ Θ is encountered. To
formalise this, with a slight abuse of notation let J(x) =
J(x,{θm}m∈M ) be the cost function of the corresponding
scenario program of program P and J+(x) = J(x,{θm}m∈M ∪
{θ}) the cost defined over M+ 1 scenarios by taking into
account the new sample θ .
Corollary 2: Under Assumptions 3 and 4 we have that
PM{{θm}m∈M ∈ΘM :
P(θ ∈Θ : J+(x∗)> J(x∗))> ε} ≤ β , (20)
where β =
n
∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
ε j(1− ε)M− j (21)
Proof: Let (x∗,γ∗) be the optimal solution of program
P
′
, which implies that γ∗ = max
m∈M
g(x∗,θm). As such,
P(θ ∈Θ : h(x∗,γ∗,θ)> 0) = P(θ ∈Θ : g(x∗,θ)> γ∗) =
P(θ ∈Θ : g(x∗,θ)> max
m∈M
g(x∗,θm)) =
P(θ ∈Θ : max{g(x∗,θ), max
m∈M
g(x∗,θm)}> max
m∈M
g(x∗,θm)) =
P(θ ∈Θ : J+(x∗)> J(x∗)), (22)
where the second equality follows from the fact that γ∗ =
max
m∈M
g(x∗,θm), and the last one from the definitions of J
and J+. Direct substitution of (22) in (17) of Theorem 3
concludes then the proof..
IV. NUMERICAL STUDY
A. Probabilistic guarantees for all feasible electric vehicle
charging schedules
In the following set-up, a cooperative scheme is consid-
ered, where agents-vehicles minimize a common electricity
cost, while their charging schedules are subject to constraints.
However, most of the work up to this point assumed that
these constraints are purely deterministic [38], [3], [39].
We extend this framework by imposing uncertainty on the
constraints by considering the following program
min
x∈RnN
J(x) subject to
x ∈
⋂
θ∈Θ
∏
i∈N
{xi ∈ [xi(θ),xi(θ)] :
n
∑
t=1
x(t)i ≥ Ei(θ)}. (23)
The two main requirements for the operation of the system
under study, namely, the lower and upper bounds imposed
on the power rate of each vehicle and the total energy level
to be achieved at the end of charging, can be modelled as
constraints of affine form. The variables xi = (x
(t)
i )
n
t=1 denote
the charging schedule for all time instances t ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
The corresponding scenario program of (23) is given by
min
x∈RnN
J(x) subject to
x ∈
⋂
m∈M
∏
i∈N
{xi ∈ [xi(θm),xi(θm)] :
n
∑
t=1
x(t)i ≥ Ei(θm)}. (24)
The cost function J is allowed to have any arbitrary form
and can even be affected by uncertainty. In our set-up we
assume that the upper and lower bounds of the charging
rate, (xi(θu))i∈N , (xi(θl))i∈N ∈ RnN are affected by the
uncertain parameters θu,θl ∈ RnN , respectively, with un-
certainty representing volatile grid power restrictions. Each
of the parameters’ elements is extracted according to the
same probability distribution N (0,0.5), where N (µ,σ) is
a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation
σ . The distribution is truncated by a prespecified quantity
to avoid infeasibility issues. We further assume that the
uncertainty is additive, i.e., x(θu) = xnom + θu and x(θl) =
xnom + θl , where each element of xnom is drawn from a
uniform probability distribution with support [10,20] kW
and xnom is set to 2 kW. Finally, the energy capacity of
the battery can be affected by a variety of factors such as
battery aging and lithium plating for Li-ion batteries. These
phenomena can have an important effect on the amount
of energy required by each vehicle to fully charge, thus
imposing uncertainty on the final energy level to be achieved
by each of them by the end of the charging cycle. In our
set-up, the uncertainty in the total energy E = (Ei)i∈N (in
kWh) of each vehicle at the end of charging is yet again
assumed to be additive, i.e., E = Enom +θe, where θe ∈ RN
and its elements are extracted according to the probability
N (0,1) and Enomi ∈ R is the nominal final energy demand
of each agent i ∈ N . The uncertainty vector is given by
θ = [θu,θl ,θe] ∈ RN(2n+1).
Considering N = 5 vehicles and n = 12 time slots we
construct the feasibility region of the corresponding sce-
nario program (24). Using Mtest = 40000 test samples we
empirically compute the probability that a new yet unseen
constraint will be violated by at least one element of the
feasible region and compare it with the theoretical violation
level ε(k) from Theorem 2. The results are shown in Figure
2, where the red line corresponds to the empirical probability
and the blue line corresponds to the theoretical bound. Note
that an upper bound for the theoretical violation level ε(k)
can be obtained by counting the number of the facets k= FM
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability of violation of the feasibility region (red line)
versus the the theoretical violation level for a different number of samples
M = {5000,6000, . . . ,10000}. To calculate the probability of violation a
total of Mtest = 40000 samples is used.
of the feasible set or by leveraging the geometry of our
numerical example to provide an upper bound for FN , that
is FN ≤ 2nN+N. This bound can be easily derived noticing
that the feasible region is in fact a cartesian product of N
rectangles intersected by a halfspace that corresponds to the
energy constraint. As such the worst case number of facets
for the entire polytope in our example is N(2n+1).
In general, for samples that give rise to more than one
affine constraints, the number of facets constitutes only an
upper bound for the cardinality of the minimal support
subsample. This bound is tight only in the case when
there is a one to one correspondence between a sample
realization and a scalar-valued constraint. This implies that
the guarantees for the feasible subset of the problem under
study can be significantly tighter. The reason behind the
use of the looser bound k = 2nN +N in our example lies
in the fact that its quantification is straightforward and the
use of a support subsample function is thus not required.
In other cases, however, where an upper bound for k is
absent, the methodologies for the detection of redundant
affine constraints provided by [34] and references therein
can be used as minimal support subsample functions.
Figure 3 illustrates the violation level ε(k) with respect to
the number of agents N for a fixed confidence level 1−β , a
fixed multi-sample of size M = 10000 and k∗ = 2Nn+N. It
is clear that for the same number of samples the probabilistic
guarantees provided by Theorem 2 for all feasible solutions
become more conservative as the number of vehicles in the
fleet increases. This means that more samples are required to
provide the same probabilistic guarantees as the dimension
grows.
B. Agent independent robustness certificates for the optimal
electric vehicle charging profile
In this set-up the cost to be minimized is influenced by the
electricity price, which in turn is considered to be a random
variable affected by uncertainty. Uncertainty here refers to
price volatility. All electric vehicles cooperate with each
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Fig. 3. The violation level ε with respect to the number of agents N for
β = 10−6 and a multi-sample of size M = 10000. Note how the violation
level for a fixed number of samples is agent dependent, i.e., the guarantees
become more conservative as the number of agents increases.
other choosing their charging schedules so as to minimize
the total uncertain electricity cost, while satisfying their
own deterministic constraints. To this end, we consider the
following uncertain electric vehicle charging problem
PEV : min
x∈RnN
f (x)+max
θ∈Θ
g(x,θ),
subject to xi ∈ [xi,xi],
n
∑
t=1
x(n)i ≥ Ei for all i ∈N , (25)
where f (x) = ∑
i∈N
fi(xi,x−i) = σ(x)T p0(σ(x)) is the de-
terministic part of the electricity cost that depends on a
nominal electricity price p0(σ(x)) = A0σ(x) + b0 that is,
in turn, a function of the aggregate consumption of the
vehicles. g(x,θ)= ∑
i∈N
gi((xi,x−i,θ)=σ(x)T p(σ(x),θ) con-
stitutes the uncertain part of the electricity cost, where the
price p(σ(x),θ) = A(θ)σ(x)+b(θ) is additionally affected
by the uncertain parameter θ extracted from the support
set Θ according to a probability distribution P, where Θ
and P are considered unknown. The diagonal entries of
A0 = diag({at}nt=1) ∈ Rn×n and b0 ∈ Rn are derived by
rescaling a winter weekday demand profile in the UK, while
A(θ)∈Rn×n is an uncertain symmetric positive semi-definite
matrix and b(θ) ∈Rn for any θ ∈Θ. The vectors xi,xi ∈Rn
constitute the lower and upper bound of the charging rate of
vehicle i ∈N , respectively, while Ei ∈R is the final energy
to be achieved by each vehicle i ∈ N by the end of the
charging cycle.
Following the same lines as in Section III, we apply an
epigraphic reformulation and use samples for Θ to obtain the
following scenario program
PscEV : min
(x,γ)∈RnN+1
f (x)+ γ, (26)
subject to xi ∈ [xi,xi],
n
∑
t=1
x(n)i ≥ Ei, for all i ∈N ,
g(x,θm)≤ γ, for all m ∈M .
Each A(θm) ∈ Rn×n, is considered to be a diagonal matrix,
whose elements {a(θm)},m ∈M are extracted according
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Fig. 4. Mean and worst-case empirical probability of violation of the
optimal solution with respect to the number of agents versus the theoretical
violation level ε = 0.0885. The number of samples used is M = 500
and β = 10−6. By drawing a different multi-sample for each choice of
the number of agents N = {10,20,30,40,50}, we solve the corresponding
scenario program for a fixed number of time slots n = 12. We then repeat
this process 20 times (note that the multi-sample used for each repetition
is also different) and compute the empirical probability of violation of the
obtained optimal solutions, using Mtest = 100000 test samples.
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Fig. 5. The number of samples required with respect to the number of
agents N = {10, . . . ,50} using the results of Theorem 1 versus the one that
would have been obtained if (19) is used instead. We consider a charging
cycle of duration n= 12. The red line corresponds to Theorem 3, while the
blue line corresponds to (19).
to a lognormal distribution, normalised with respect to the
number of agents. The elements of b(θm) ∈ Rn follow a
uniform distribution, as in [20]. For each agent i ∈ N ,
the upper bound xi takes a random integer value in the
set [15,25], the lower bound xi is set to zero and the final
energy to be achieved by the end of the charging cycle is
predetermined to a feasible value over the considered time
interval.
Note that our results can be used alongside any opti-
mization algorithm irrespective of its nature, i.e., centralised,
decentralised or distributed; here we solved the problem in
a centralised fashion. We fix the number of time-steps to
n = 12, and solve the scenario program for different values
of the number of agents N ∈ {10,20, . . . ,50}. The number
of samples we use for each problem is M = 500. By fixing
β = 10−6 and using the bound
ε =
2
M
(ln
1
β
+nlog2), (27)
which is a sufficient condition (see [36, (p.42)]) for sat-
isfaction of (18), we obtain the theoretical violation level
ε = 0.0885. Note that the dimension we use to provide
probabilistic guarantees for the optimal solution is set, in
accordance to Theorem 2 to n+1 instead of nN+1, which
circumvents the computational issues related to the rapid
surge in dimension due to the multiplication of the number
of agents with the number of time slots.
By drawing a different multi-sample for each choice of
the number of agents N ∈ {10,20,30,40,50} we solve the
corresponding scenario program for a fixed number of time
slots n= 12. We then repeat this process 20 times (note that
the multi-sample used for each repetition is also different)
and compute the empirical probability of violation of the ob-
tained optimal solutions, using Mtest = 100000 test samples
each time. The mean and worst-case empirical probability
of violation is depicted in Figure 4 in comparison with the
theoretical violation level ε . The empirical values are always
below the theoretical level of violation, which is constant
with the number of agents due to the agent independent
nature of our Theorem 2. In addition, the trend in Figure 4
shows, as expected by Theorem 2, that the number of agents
does not affect the empirical probability of violation.
This result highlights the fact that, for fixed number
of time periods n, the number of samples M required to
provide identical probabilistic guarantees, as the size of the
fleet of electric vehicles increases, remains constant. This is
illustrated in Figure 5, where we show the number of samples
required (for ε = 0.01, β = 10−6 and n = 12) using the
results of Theorem 1 versus the number of samples needed
to provide the same robustness certificates using the classic
results in scenario approach for a different number of agents
N = 10, . . . ,50. The red line corresponds to Theorem 1 and
shows the agent independent nature of our guarantees, while
the blue line corresponds to the conservative agent dependent
result of (19).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We first considered a general class of optimization pro-
grams with an arbitrary cost function and uncertain convex
constraints and provided a posteriori bounds for the proba-
bility of violation of all feasible solutions. We then focused
on a different class of multi-agent programs that involved an
uncertain aggregative term and deterministic constraints. For
such problems we provided agent independent probabilistic
guarantees for the optimal solution in an a priori fashion.
Effort is being made towards extending our results to
provide agent independent probabilistic guarantees in a non-
cooperative set-up, giving rise to aggregative games. In
addition, we aim at generalising the methodology of our
first contribution to provide in an a posteriori fashion tighter
robustness certificates that depend only on a subset of the
feasible region, which circumscribes the game solutions.
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